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The Ethiopian Student Movement:
A Rejoinder to Bahru Zewde’s
The Quest for Socialist Utopia
Messay Kebede, University of Dayton, Ohio

Bahru’s book presents a historical account of the Ethiopian student movement from its inception to the crucial split into rival political parties shortly
before the eruption of the revolution and the rise of the Derg. Though the
account does not release new facts, it gives a detailed picture of the main
events, circumstances, and actors that shaped the movement. The book
narrates the important moments in chronological order and analyzes their
contributions to the process of radicalization. One of Bahru’s conspicuous
suppositions is that radicalization should be seen “as a process rather
than as a sudden development.”1 This supposition enables him to weigh
the inputs of external and internal factors on the radicalization process.
The book is not content with a historical account of the movement;
it also briefly criticizes other authors, Ethiopian as well as foreign, who
have written on the same subject. While most of the works mentioned
are criticized for historical inaccuracies and a lack of primary sources, my
book on the same subject, Radicalism and Cultural Dislocation in Ethiopia,
1960‒1974,2 is singled out by virulent polemical attacks denouncing inaccuracies and shortage of primary sources. Even the entire work is rebuffed on
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the ground that it is based on fallacious and malicious premises designed
to discredit the student movement. Going beyond the characterization of
my book as “dismissive,” Bahru removes my right—as a philosopher—to
write on the issue because in his view the student movement “has to be
viewed not as a philosophical issue but as a historical phenomenon.”3
He also looks for support in reviews of my book that were critical, but
ignores those, significantly more numerous, that applauded the book for
its theoretical inputs and original approach. Interestingly, Bahru refers
to Richard Reid’s review as one critical appraisal but fails to mention the
highly positive assessments permeating the review. The proof is Reid’s
conclusion, which reads as follows:
Overall, this is a thoughtful, provocative and insightful book, essential
reading for anyone interested in Ethiopia during the revolutionary years
of the 1960s and 1970s, and the era of political radicalisation in Africa and
Asia more broadly. This is a book which grapples with such fundamental
themes as elitism, modernity, education and development, intertwining
them and offering new perspectives on how revolution, broadly defined,
goes awry, despite best intentions.4

My intention is not to defend the right of philosophers to theorize on
social movements and changes; nor is it to defend the value of my work
against Bahru’s attacks. Rather, I want to show that his criticisms of my
book are either contradictory or express an inability to analyze from a
level surpassing mere narration. In thus exposing the theoretical poverty
of Bahru’s book, as well as the inconsistency of his project of shielding
the student movement from criticism, I will explicate how and why Bahru
intentionally misreads my book. I add that what Bahru calls “dismissive”
is actually my intent to show the tragic nature of the Ethiopian student
movement. Doubtless, the students had the good intention of correcting
glaring injustices and modernizing their country, but they did it in such
a way that it blew up in their faces and they themselves became the first
victims. As the saying goes, “The road to hell is paved with good intentions.”
To expose this reversal—which Bahru occasionally recognizes in speaking
of “tragic consequences”—is not dismissive.5 What needs to be explained
is why Bahru is dead set on criticizing me even when I agree with his own
views.
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Even as Bahru stigmatizes my book for being inimical to the student
movement, his own dedication to the movement reads as follows: “To the
Youth of Ethiopia who assumed a burden incommensurate with their
intellectual resources and their country’s political assets and paid dearly
for it.”6 The dedication does no more than echo the customary view of
the then emperor and ruling class ascribing the movement to infantile
impetuosity. Moreover, if the students did not have the intellectual capacity
to understand the situation of their country, let alone lead it, it is plain that
Bahru describes the movement as a pretentious, quixotic venture. Bahru is
so keen to show that the movement was inspired solely by youth generosity
that he dismisses any attempt to assign other motives to the students. The
students, Bahru says, “did what they did in all genuineness and sincerity.
They had no hidden agenda.”7 This statement is surprising in view of the
transformation of the movement into radical parties ferociously vying for
the control of power. What is more, the active and massive participation
of Eritrean and Tigrean students, many in leadership positions, had to
do more with resentment of Amhara rule than with social altruism, as
witnessed by their massive involvement in ethnonationalist and secessionist movements soon after the collapse of imperial rule. Is it not naïve
to attribute these major developments to youth generosity only?
Bahru misses the point that assigning a hidden agenda to the movement is to take it seriously, for it is to maintain that weighty motives rather
than passing impetuosity inspired the movement. But then his contradiction is glaringly obvious: though he denounces my “underestimation of the
structural causes that led to its [the student movement’s] rise,” he himself
derives the radicalization of students from the biological notion of youth.8
When the whole issue is to understand what forces shaped the Ethiopian
youth into a radical movement, Bahru proposes the biological features associated with a stage in human development as an explanatory concept. In
so doing, he completely overlooks the elitist impact that Western education
has on students in a largely traditional society, namely, the belief that they
are entitled to social leadership on account of their exclusive enlightenment. He also becomes unable to show concretely how the structural
features of the imperial regime impacted on the radicalization of students.
Though he speaks of the causal influence of the structural conditions,
the predominance assigned to the biological state of youth significantly
dilutes the determining impact of the structural conditions to the point
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of reducing them to the level of mere excuses. In thus turning structural
causes into pretexts to oppose the regime, Bahru fails to show how the
natural disposition of youth is shaped into a revolutionary consciousness.
For instance, unlike Bahru, many authors have linked radicalization with
such issues as the fear of unemployment, government repression, the
absence of social mobility, ethnic animosity, and so forth.9 Because Bahru
dismisses motives other than youth altruism, he misses the fact that the
issue is not youth, but the conditions that radicalized it.
The objection according to which the attribution of political ambition to the student movement is a view inspired by hindsight bias simply
discounts the progress achieved by social sciences and philosophy in the
comprehension of how hidden, unconscious motives exercise profound
influence on human actions. In expressly rejecting the impact of hidden
motives, Bahru takes us back to the time when everything was taken at
face value, when youth was just generosity. Not only does Bahru support
this naïve and uncritical approach, but he also makes it the mark of the
superiority of his book over all others on the same subject. Indeed, after
saying that the movement must not be “judged from the vantage point of
the present,” he adds that “it has to be recorded first and foremost ‘the way
it exactly happened,’ and not how it should have been.”10
Two major missteps occur here. (1) Bahru believes that his primary and
secondary sources recorded everything without any bias or preconceived
agenda. As such, they should be taken at face value and the work of the
historian is to reproduce and include them in a sequentially ordered
narrative. This utterly uncritical approach forgets that any attempt at an
objective study of a social phenomenon rests on the distinction between
real and apparent or seeming motives. (2) For Bahru, any assessment of
the past from the present is mistaken, for it assigns motives that were in
the past nonexistent. Yet the opposite is more likely, in that the disparity
between declared motives and actual actions reveals the displacement of
seeming motives by real motives. Actions speak louder than words, says
common sense. Indeed, the true motive of a generation is revealed by what
it does, and not by what it thinks about itself. The objectivity of a scholarly
study depends on the effort it makes to unravel real motives rather than
on how well it reproduces the illusions of the time.
Because Bahru is committed to a work merely reproducing what
the Ethiopian youth said about itself, it is no wonder that his book does
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not utilize an interdisciplinary approach. Besides an almost journalistic
reporting on the history of student movements in a global context, the
book totally ignores the rich and varied conceptual resources that other
disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, political science,
and others, offer for studying the motives, conditions, circumstances, and
outcomes of youth and student movements. The characteristics of these
studies is that they go beyond the work of echoing what students say about
themselves in order to disclose underlying forces and motives.11
Among the scholars who have studied the Ethiopian student movement, the only one who receives leniency from Bahru is Randi Rønning
Balsvik. He characterizes her book on the student movement as a “solid
empirical work” and even suggests that his own intent is to build on that
solid foundation.12 Such a project would have been promising if indeed it
had been followed through. Unfortunately, Bahru leaves out the theoretical
insights of Balsvik’s study, reducing it to a mere gathering of empirical
data. For instance, Balsvik notes that the “moderate forces were still strong
among the students” so that radicalization must be attributed to the repressive stand taken by the imperial government.13 One major implication of
repression is that it promoted the few radical students to the leadership
position by validating the need for a radical riposte to a government offering nothing but repression to even moderate demands.
Radicalization did not emerge from youth but from the political,
cultural, and material conditions of life. Unlike Bahru, Balsvik defines
Ethiopia’s modern education as “an alien institution,” with the consequence that one factor of radicalization is cultural uprootedness, inspiring
the desire to demolish everything and rebuild the entire society anew.14
To the extent that uprootedness leaves a void that cries for a substitute,
Balsvik rightly conjectures that “for the majority of students belief in
[Marxism] and commitment to socio-economic change can be said to have
filled the void created by the erosion of their religious roots.”15 The upshot
of all this is that “ideology had become more important to the students
than the survival of Ethiopia as a state.”16 Clearly, radicalization does not
spring from the youth factor only; it is also an outcome of the uprooting
effect of modern education craving for a substitute belief. Unfortunately,
Bahru pays no heed to these and other insights, which show that the issue
of radicalization is far more complicated than the simple fact of youth
generosity.
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What is perplexing is that Bahru does not totally ignore the impact
of the legacy of traditional culture. He thus mentions—once—the “antireligious character of communism” but never raises the issue of knowing how the fundamentally religious character of Ethiopian culture had
vanished and so Ethiopians easily became infatuated with a militant
atheist doctrine.17 Instead, he uses the religious issue to attack my work by
saying, “contrary to Messay, I would tend to see in this canonical character
of student radicalism not a negation of the past but its continuation.”18
The surprise here is that I agree with Bahru, since I say that there was “a
transmutation of the religious orthodoxy . . . into a Marxist orthodoxy.”19
Moreover, I write that “the rejection of traditional beliefs and values as a
result of modern education brought about an ideological void, which in
turn activated the longing for substitute beliefs.”20 Precisely, to speak of
“substitute”—a concept widely used throughout my book—is to suggest
that the receiving culture did not undergo any renovation so that Marxism
was absorbed with the traditional dogmatic mentality. The culture was in
a longing state and, as such, devoid of any aptitude to critically appraise
foreign influences or adapt them to Ethiopian realities. Accordingly, despite
his attempt to denigrate the importance I give to the traditional culture,
Bahru’s own appeal to the persistence of the traditional mentality makes
my point, to wit, that neither structural causes, nor the global dominance
of Marxist ideology in the 1960s, and still less youth idealism, are enough to
explain radicalization. For radicalization to happen, the soil receiving these
influences must be fertile, or as Bahru himself puts it, Marxism-Leninism
became a dogma because “on the soil of Christian Orthodoxy were sown
the seeds of Marxist orthodoxy.”21
Though Bahru criticizes my description of the student movement as
a manufactured movement, he himself introduces a distinction between
the movement and its radicalization, since he asserts that the radical
core is “responsible for the injection into student debates of a degree of
self-righteousness and dogmatism.”22 What this means is that, without this
radical core, the movement would have remained a moderate one. But
then, is this not to admit that the movement, as it ended up being, was
a manufactured movement? Furthermore, once the distinction between
the radical few and the majority is established, it is incumbent on Bahru
to explain why the radical core was able to assume the leadership of the
movement and how the majority of students followed a direction opposed
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to their initial intent. Unfortunately, Bahru does not even raise the problem,
let alone provide an answer.
What Bahru misses when he denounces my “underestimation of
the structural causes” and criticizes my approach to the movement as
being manufactured is that my intent is not so much to explain a student
rebellion, which was almost universal in the 1960s and early 1970s, as to
elucidate an unusually radical mood. Such a degree of radicalization was
indeed rare. I was in France as a student at the time and the only movement
that showed a similar level of radicalization, apart from that of French
students, was the Iranian student movement. Even African students were
apprehensive of the extremist positions that Ethiopian students used
to take. I note in my book Ali Mazrui’s characterization of Ethiopian
students, after he gave a talk to university students in Ethiopia in 1973,
as the “most radical African students [he] had seen.”23 My argument does
not underestimate the impact of structural causes, but simply argues that
these causes by themselves are not enough to explain such a high degree
of radicalization. Other factors, for instance cultural, must have intervened.
The attempt to explain radicalization by structural causes only—I say
“attempt” because, as stated previously, for Bahru, youth generosity is the
primary factor—logically assumes that there was no alternative to radicalization. Yet Bahru endorses the assumption for the purpose of concealing
the derailment of the movement. That is why he is never clear on the
question of an alternative. At times, he seems to suggest that radicalization
was the only way out, a view that appears to emanate from a relapse into
the dogma of Leninism. At other times, he seems to consider the idea of
an alternative, when for instance he assigns great importance to the 1960
military coup against the imperial regime, as though to suggest that if the
coup had succeeded, things would have been quite different. Also, Bahru
states that many among the top officials of the regime were aware of
the need for reforms, some even advising the emperor to move toward a
constitutional monarchy with a prime minister heading the government.
The noted readiness for reforms shows that there was another, reformist,
alternative, one that did not materialize because it was opposed by the
emperor, who understandably did not want to forsake his absolutism.
Let us go further: even students, according to Bahru, were committed to
a reformist agenda. To quote him, “if there was one distinct orientation that
most students had in the mid-1960s, it was clearly nationalist.”24 Termed
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Ethiopianism, the movement articulated an ideology opposing both the
West and Communism. The fact that this ideology gave way to MarxismLeninism requires an explanation that Bahru does not provide. In addition
to showing the manufactured nature of the radicalization process, the
availability of a reformist ideology turns radicalization into a complicated
matter. It leads to the idea that factors other than mere structural causes
must have intervened, for it was not necessary for students to become
zealots of Leninism to denounce the imperial regime and propose a moderate course of change. What else does the existence of reformism among
students confirm but that radicalization was a manufactured outcome?
Yet, for Bahru, one cannot speak of a manufactured movement “unless one
disputes the validity of the issues raised by the students.”25 Again, one need
not be a Leninist activist to denounce the regime: reformism was another,
actually more natural, possibility.
Here Bahru delivers his ultimate thought, since he goes beyond scholarly criticism and accuses me of being nostalgic for the imperial time.
Indeed, how else could one explain the real motive for my dismissive
attitude? That I was a supporter of the regime is, according to Bahru,
apparent, because “one searches in vain throughout Messay’s book for any
substantial critique of a system that could not even tolerate the idea of a
constitutional monarchy, let alone introduce any meaningful land reform
or tolerate regional autonomy.”26 The true reason why Bahru is so enraged
about the book is now in the open: I denigrate the generous movement
and sacrifices of students by giving them hidden and detrimental motives
because I am nostalgic for the imperial regime.
There is no need here to show in lengthy detail how Bahru’s biased
reading overlooks the numerous denunciations of the imperial regime
dispersed throughout my book, not to mention a whole chapter—chapter
9—titled “Objective Causes of the Radicalization of Students and Intellectuals,” in which I depict the serious flaws of the imperial regime. It suffices
to give one quotation describing broadly the sociopolitical environment
in which student protests took place to refute Bahru’s reading of my book.
I write:
Not only did the educational system become so dysfunctional that the
number of university dropouts dramatically increased, but also the
national economy’s sluggish growth could not absorb even university
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graduates. Add to this major crisis the imperial regime’s complete reluctance to enact reforms, and you will understand how progressively
the majority of students came under the influence of the radicals, who
wanted to destroy the system. As we shall see, neither the regime nor
the university administration did anything to help moderates have
some influence in the student movement. On the contrary, the way they
handled protests and demands propelled the radicals to uncontested
leadership of the movement.27

Granted all the social evils of the regime, there remains the question of why
moderates lost the leadership to radical groups. In other words, the cause of
the students was indeed legitimate, but it did not have to embrace a radical
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Bahru is allergic to this way of formulating the
problem because its theoretical content transcends narration, which, in
his eyes, is the only appropriate approach to the issue at hand.
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